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ABSTRACT 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF 
"MARKET DISCIPLINE" OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET BANKING RISK 
Bank regulators are concerned with the dramatic increase and risk 
exposure of Off-Balance Sheet (OBS) banking activities in recent 
years, and proposed that some OBS activities be included in the 
calculation of a risk-based capital requirement. This paper 
investigates the riskiness of OBS activities. Specifically, this 
paper reports on three capital market tests of OBS banking risk: 
the impact of OBS activities on the risk-premia of subordinated 
debt, on equity risk and on systematic risk of large commercial 
banks and bank holding companies. The underlying premise of this 
study is that the bank stockholders and subordinated debtholders 
are more exposed to the risk of bank failure resulting from OBS 
banking risk than insured and uninsured depositholders. If aBS 
activities are significantly related to market measures of bank 
risk, then "market discipline" of such activities exists. The 
empirical literature, to date, has ignored the impact of CBS 
banking risk on the default risk-premia borne by subordinated debt­
holders. The results indicate that most aBS activities reduce risk­
premia and equity risk, but do not affect systematic risk. Both 
stockholders and subordinated debtholders price these aBS 
activities as risk-reducing. Therefore, regulatory interference in 
the form of additional capital requirement of aBS activities will 
penalize large commercial banks and will create distortions in the 
financial intermediation market. 
I. Introduction 
Bank regulators are concerned with the dramatic increase in off-balance 
sheet (OBS) banking activities in recent years. Off-balance sheet activities 
are not summarized in dollars on the balance sheet but are instead given in the 
verbal footnotes to balance sheets. Ho,{ever, banks are required to report such 
activities to regulatory authorities. In off-balance sheet transactions, banks 
earn fee incomes instead of interest spreads, and loans are not held on the 
books. 
As a result of these OBS activities, banks may face three general types of 
portfolio risk: credit risk on underwritten guarantees, interest rate risk due 
to liability mismatches on commitment takedmms and liquidity risk due to 
overextension of obligations. Unlike balance sheet items, these potential 
obligations are not funded with balance sheet liabilities and are not considered 
in determining a bank's regulatory capital requirements. On March 1, 1988, the 
Federal Reserve, in conjunction ,{ith other bank regulatory agencies and foreign 
central banks issued a risk-based capital proposal, which will be phased in by 
1992, that some off-balance sheet items be included in calculating such a 
capital requirement. 
A key rationale for OBS banking capital regulation is an assumed 
information asymmetry between bank managers and liability holders. The 
regulatory presumption is that such ODS activities are risky and the market 
fails to recognize the risk embodied in such ODS activities. The "market 
discipline'! studies of ODS banking risk have addressed the question of whether 
market prices of bank liabilities reflect the risk of ODS activities. If 
"market discipline" exists and off-balance sheet activities are found to be 
risk-sensitive, bank liability holders can distinguish ODS banking risk. The 
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assumed information asymmetry rationale for capital regulation of OBS 
activities, therefore, becomes less convincing. 
The purpose of this paper is to rigorously explore the riskiness and 
motivation of OBS banking activities. This research reports on three capital 
market tests of OBS banking risk: the impact of OBS activities on the 
risk-premia of subordinated debt, on equity risk and on systematic risk of large 
commercial banks and bank holding companies. This research improves upon the 
existing evidence of OBS banking risk in three important \.;ays. First, ,..hile the 
relationships betHeen OBS activities and, total and systematic risks have been 
studied, the empirical literature, to date, has ignored the impact of OBS risk 
on the default-risk premia borne by subordinated debt-holders. Second, this 
paper examines the riskiness of all 19 OBS items -- categorized into seven 
groups depending upon their similar characteristics -- from call and income 
reports of the FDIC tapes. Third, this study employs an etended data set 
ranging from 1984 to 1988. A pooled cross-section and time-series generalized 
least squares (GLS) estimation procedure is employed to examine the "market 
discipline" of OBS activities. The underlying premise of this study is that the 
bank stockholders and subordinated debtholders are more exposed to the risk of 
bank failure than depositholders. Therefore, their assessment of the riskiness 
of OBS activities is realistically determined. 
II. Previous Research 
The theoretical analysis of OBS banking activities primarily deals \.;ith the 
motivation and existence of such activities. The overriding conclusions of 
theoretical analyses are that (1) OBS activities are natural banking activities, 
and hence do not affect business risk of banking firms, (2) OBS activities 
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provide diversification potential to bank stockholders, and hence reduce total 
risk but do not affect systematic risk, (3) OBS activities are potentially 
leverage increasing, and hence increase financial risk. 
A number of competing hypotheses concerning risk-taking behavior of OBS 
items have been proposed in literature. A bank's activity in the market for 
off-balance sheet credit enhancement is a function of its willingness to 
accommodate the needs of its customers, the market's perception of bank's 
quality as reflected in balance sheet decisions and the incentives provided by 
the regulators. Theories of financial intermediation suggest that OBS banking 
activities are designed to provide credit enhancement services to its customers. 
By guaranteeing funds availability, the intermediary has an incentive to 
efficiently monitor the borrowers, produce information and signal its 
credibility, and specialize in credit evaluation. OBS banking activities thus 
represent substitute methods for allocating credit with complementaries in 
production. The risk-return trade-off between saving information services and 
warehousing assets will induce a bank to divide its business bet,{een both 
balance and off-balance sheet financial activities. Therefore, OBS activities 
do not affect fundamental business risk of banking firms. Because part of 
business risk is diversifiable, the remaining market risk is also unaffected by 
OBS activities. The diversification hypothesis implies that banks engage in OBS 
activities to diversify its asset portfolio in order to achieve within firm 
diversification and to avoid the wrath of disappointed bank shareholders [see 
Diamond (1984), Pavel (1987, 1988)J. Vithin-firrn bank risk is reduced by low 
correlation of OBS activities with other bank asset activities. ~Iarket risk of 
OBS activities is determined by diversification within banking firm and by 
stockholders. Therefore, part of diversifiable risk of bankfs total risk is 
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eliminated by bank's \Jithin-firm diversification potential of ODS activities, 
and part is eliminated by diversified stockholders in their mm portfolios. 
This hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between total bank risk and OilS 
activities. 
The Leverage Hypothesis states that fixed rate deposit insurance together 
with capital requirements provide incentives to increase financial leverage 
through the issuance of OBS activities that are not subject to capital 
requirements. By increasing financial leverage in this way, a bank can enhance 
whatever subsidies it receives from deposit insurance. This hypothesis thus 
predicts a positive relationship between total bank risk and OilS activities .[see 
Pyle (1985), Benveniste and Berger (1986)]. 
The Collaterization and Underinvestment Hypothesis states that SLCs and 
loan sales, two OBS items, are substitutes for collaterized debt claims because 
banks are prohibited from issuing collaterized deposits. Loan sales and SLCs 
have payoff characteristics similar to secured debt. Like secured debt, these 
off-balance activities permit banks to sell a portion of cash-flo\Js associated 
with ne\J investment opportunities. The ability to engage in off- balance sheet 
activities, therefore, permits banks to invest in loans with positive net 
present value that they would pass up if restricted to deposit financing. 
Capital requirements, which limit bank leverage, intensifies the under investment 
problem by restricting a bank's ability to offset reductions in bank asset risk 
with increases in financial leverage. Fixed rate deposit insurance premium 
increases the underinvestment problem because rates paid on bank deposits do not 
reflect the marginal contribution of a neli investment to the risk of bank1s 
portfolio of assets. The underinvestment problem is likely to be greater if the 
bank has riskier deposits and higher capital requirements. Therefore, the 
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amount of SLCs and Loan Sales are expected to be positively related to riskiness 
of banks [see James (1988)J. 
The empirical literature on the "market discipline" of aBS banking 
activities tests for the existence of market sensitivity to bank risk by 
regressing the relative cost of bank funds on balance-sheet and off-balance 
sheet and/or income statement measures of risk, return and market position. The 
basic issue is whether the measures of bank risk are significantly related to 
movements in bank liability or equity prices. If significant relationships are 
found, then "market discipline" is said to exist. 
The empirical evidence on the existence of "market discipline" of aBS 
banking activities in inconclusive. The earliest \wrk by PettHay (1976, 1976a), 
Beighly, Boyd and Jacobs (1975), Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) examined bank 
financial policies on equity and liability prices. 
PettHay investigated the impact of the bank's capital position on (1) the 
risk premium of the bank's capital notes, (2) the bank's beta and (3) the 
price-earnings (P/E) ratio, during the 1971-74 period. This cross-section study 
indicated that dividend yield, payout ratio and earnings groHth are significant 
in explaining the variability of price-earnings ratios. He also found no 
apparent relationship between beta and these accounting variables for large 
banks prior to 1974 and slightly significant inverse relationship after 1974. 
A study by Beighly, Boyd and Jacobs (1975) examined the relationship 
between financial leverage and stock price for 113 bank holding companies for 
the periods 1972 through 1974. They used the average level of the common stock 
price (three month average) as a dependent variable. They found that dividends, 
earnings gro\,1th, firm size and loan loss rate were the most important 
determinants of the market prices of bank equities. They also found that for 
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the given sample of bank holding companies, the higher a bank's degree of 
financial leverage at a point in time, the lower is the bank's stock price 
(after controlling for bank size, earnings gro\{th, dividends and loan losses). 
Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) investigated the relationship bet\{een financial 
policies of commercial banks and two market determined measures of risk. 
Financial policies are proxied by average balance sheet and income statement 
data over the period 1972-76 for 95 commercial banks and bank holding companies. 
Accounting data measures of financial leverage, liquidity, dividend payout 
ratio, loan loss experience and variability in earnings and deposits are used. 
These are related to a measure of systematic risk (beta) and total risk 
(standard deviation of equity return), also calculated for the same five-year 
period. Bivariate and multivariate relationships are examined. As independent 
variables used to explain beta, the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio, 
variability of deposits and the loan to deposit ratio are significant. In 
explaining total risk the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio, a financial 
leverage measure, variability of deposits and earnings, a loan loss measure and 
a liquidity measure are all significant. 
Baer and Bre\{er (1986) regressed CD rates over quarterly measures of bank 
accounting risk variables for a sample of 37 banks over the time period 1979-82. 
They present evidence that bank CD rates are strongly affected by accounting 
based measures of bank risk-taking. The market for large, uninsured CDs helps 
discipline bank risk-t~{ing by penalizing risky banks with a higher CD risk 
premium. Baer and Brewer study (1985) supports the conclusions of another study 
by Hannan and Han\{eck (1988) that employs survey data on CD rates for five 
different maturities and finds that CD risk premiums increase \{ith both the 
ratio of risky assets to capital and uncertainty regarding bank returns on 
assets. 
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Avery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988) conducted a cross-section study of 
subordinated debt pricing for both 1983 and 1984. Subordinated debt is junior 
to uninsured CDs so that its pricing ought to show clear responses to risk 
measures. HOwever, examining the spread over the comparable treasury yields 
these authors were unable to demonstrate the effect of any balance sheet or 
income statement data on bank costs. They also conclude that implicit insurance 
of a bank debt is not a consistent explanation for the lack of correlation 
bet'veen default premia and on-balance accounting measures of risk because there 
is significant variation of risk premia across banks in the sample. 
Although none of these studies include OBS banking risk variables, these 
studies show the appropriateness of accounting-based risk models in analyzing 
the impact of OBS banking activities on bank risk measures. 
Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies (1985) explain CD rates as function of the 
general level of interest rates and various measures of bank risk including 
SLCs. Accounting risk variables used are loan-loss reserve position, net income 
ratio, interest sensitive liabilities, capital over risky assets and SLCs over 
risky assets. The effects of bank's SLC exposure on CD rate is treated as 
having t'vo components: a leverage effect (the ratio of bank capital to risky 
assets including loans and SLCs) and a credit quality effect (the ratio of SLCs 
to risky assets, to allo,v for differences in credit quality of the loan and SLC 
portfolios). Based on this model, they found that CD rates rose with increasing 
leverage and fell with increases in SLCs as a proportion of total risky assets. 
Since these t,vo factors tend to cancel each other, the net effect on bank risk 
of an increase in bank's SLC exposure apparently is negligible. The inclusion 
of SLC as a ratio of total risky assets did not improve the explanatory power of 
this model. They explain this to be due to the capital/loan variable that 
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impounds both the beneficial impacts of SLCs on credit quality and the adverse 
impact of SLCs on capital exposure. Their study also found that, despite higher 
credit quality, increasing SLCs did not reduce bank risk. 
Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson (1986) use an empirical method based on a 
version of CAP~1 that estimates systematic risk associated with various 
components of a bank's income statement, balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
activities. In a time-series, cross-sectional analysis of 63 bank holding 
companies for 1983-84 with a two factor CAPJl, it is found that equity market 
prices SLCs but not loan commitments or commercial letters of credit. Moreover, 
SLCs are priced as risk-reducing, not risk-increasing activity of banks by 
well-diversified shareholders. The second factor used in CAP~I is a 
value-weighted banking industry stock market index. The regulatory implication 
of this study IS that (1) loan commitments and commercial letters of credit are 
not perceived as risk-increasing activities for banks and that their inclusion 
in the recently proposed risk-based capital requirement is wrong, and (2) a tax 
imposition in the form of capital requirement on SLCs, that disciplines bank 
management and is perceived by the equity market as risk-reducing, is 
inappropriate. 
Lynge and Lee (1987) used accounting-based risk forecasting models to 
investigate the impact of OilS items on both equity risk and systematic risk for 
large commercial banks for the time period 1984-85 for a sample of 81 large 
banks. The estimated coefficients of independent variables incorporating 
various aspects of OilS positions are statistically significant in a model 
explaining total equity risk, but not significant in a model explaining 
systematic risk. The negative coefficients of OBS variables in a model 
explaining total equity risk is attributed to diversification potential of these 
banking activities. 
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Pavel (1988) analyzes three reasons for loan sales -- funding, 
diversification, and capital requirement -- by empirically testing their 
relevance to and their implications for bank risk. The data set used In the 
study contains 117 bank holding companies during 1984 and 1985. This research 
shows, on average, loan sales have little impact on bank risk. Funding, 
diversification, and regulation all seem to be factors motivating loan sales, 
but the use of loan sales to increase diversification or avoid regulation does 
not significantly affect bank risk any more than other means to achieve these 
ends. Capital requirements do not seem to playas large a role in loan sales as 
previous research indicated. One explanation is that loan sales made 
unprofitable by capital requirement are probably sold immediately and, 
therefore, have no impact on a bank's portfolio. 
Avery and Berger (1988) regressed measures of the current performance of a 
bank's portfolio -- the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the ratio 
of net chargeoffs to total loan and ratio of net income to total loans -­
against measures of the bank's OBS activities to investigate the risk potential 
of these activities. They used two different data sets. The first is collected 
from Federal Reserve's Commitment Survey and includes a panel of individual bank 
call and commitment data ranging from 1973 to 1987. The second data set 
consists of semi-annual call Report data on 11 OBS activities and bank 
performance and control variables collected for all banks over 100 million 
dollars of gross assets from 1985 to 1987. Their research suggests that among 
major OBS activities, SLCs are associated with poor bank performance but loan 
commitments are associated ,~ith better bank performance. No statistically 
significant relationship was found betl~een bank performance and other OBS 
activities. They conclude that risk-based capital proposal may be appropriate 
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for SLCs but may be umvarranted for loan commitments because of their 
risk-reducing potential. 
James (1988) tests two hypotheses about loan sales and SLCs. The first 
hypothesis is that depositors and the FDIC are not necessarily worse off by 
these tlVO OBS banking activities. The second hypothesis is that since the 
underinvestment problem is likely to be more severe the riskier the bank's 
existing deposits and the greater the amount of equity capital a bank is 
required to use for new loans, the volume of loan sales and SLCs are expected to 
be greater the riskier the bank and for banks with binding capital requirement. 
An analysis of CD rates of 58 banks over the period 1984 through 1986 reveal~ no 
statistically significant relation between the risk premium on uninsured 
deposits and the amount of SLCs outstanding or loan sales. Moreover, the volume 
of SLCs relative to bank capital is found to be positively related to balance 
sheet measures of bank risk as well as financial leverage. 
This paper employs an extended data set ranging from 1984 to 1988 and 
examines risk behavior of all 19 OBS items from Call and Income Reports of the 
FDIC tapes. This research sheds further light on "market discipline" of OBS 
banking risk by regressing OBS items against default-risk premia borne by 
subordinated debtholders in addition to equity and systematic risk borne by 
stockholders. 
III.	 The Relationship of ODS Danking Activities to Risk-Premia Required on Bank 
Subordinated Debt 
3.1	 Introduction 
Subordinated debtholders are subject to a larger risk of loss than 
uninsured depositors. Market discipline by uninsured depositors appears limited 
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by (a) these depositors' ability to withdraw funds quickly once a problem 
situation becomes apparent, and (b) by the fact that they typically receive 
de facto insurance coverage when the FDIC uses the method of purchase and 
assumption to resolve a problem situation. In contrast, subordinated debt can 
be a source of funding that cannot be withdra'vn during adversity and is 
generally not assumed by the purchasing bank ln a purchase and assumption 
transaction. Thus, subordinated debtholders are generally subject to greater 
risk than uninsured depositors. 
The potential of subordinated debt to enhance market discipline is examined 
empirically by analyzing the interest rate spread between subordinated debt and 
treasury securities. This spread, or default-risk premia, is modeled as a 
function of various on-balance and off-balance measures of risk. 
3.2 Empirical Model 
The follo'ving risk-premia model is estimated over cross-section and 
time-series data using the generalized least squares (GLS) technique to examine 
the risk-behavior of OBS banking activities. The expected signs of partial 
derivatives appear on each independent variable: 
+ + + 
R - Rf = f(OBS, LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR) (1) 
where 
R - Rf = Default-risk premia; 
OBS = Seven off-balance sheet variables constructed from 19 items 
included in the RC-L schedule of the FDIC tapes; 
LEV = ratio of total liabilities over total assets; 
DIY = an index of diversification (the higher the diversification 
index is, the higher the level of diversification is in the loan portfolio); 
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ALass = ratio of loan loss reserves over total assets; 
AGAP = ratio of net position (total market rate assets minus market 
rate liabilities) to total assets; 
ASIZE = logarithm of assets of banks; 
POR = cash dividends over net income. 
Leverage (LEY), diversification (DIY), Credit risk (ALOSS), Interest rate 
risk (AGAP), Operating risk (ASIZE) and dividend payout (POR) are all on-balance 
measures of risk, and have been used extensively in "market- discipline!' studies 
of bank financial policies. These variables· have been scaled do\{n by size in 
order to avoid heteroskedasticity problem. 
Two main effects of OBS banking activities on risk, namely diversification 
and leverage effects, are rat ionalized in theoret ical literature. Ho\{ever, on 
a priori, it is difficult to say which effect dominates. The negative sign of 
DIY variable indicates that diversification by bank loan portfolio reduces total 
risk. The positive sign of LEV variable indicates that leverage ratios of banks 
increase total risk. In addition, the negative signs of OBS variables In 
equation (1) imply that, after controlling for on-balance leverage and 
diversification effects, risk-reducing diversification effect of aBS activities 
dominates risk-increasing effects of aBS activities. 
Table 1 reports 19 aBS activigties from the PC-L schedule of bank call and 
income reports. Seven off-balance variables have been constructed from these 19 
aBS items. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
This research focuses on the 100 largest U.S. banks and BRCs, as these are 
only ones with publicly traded subordinated debt and debentures. Data on yield 
measures \{ere gathered on all BRC for bank subordinated debt, debentures and 
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capital notes which were publicly traded in the NYSE, A~IEX, NASDAQ ,~ith quoted 
sale and bid prices from ~Ioody I s and Standard and Poor's bond manuals as of year 
ends 1984 through 1988. To make each BHC debt issue as homogeneous as possible, 
all zero coupon issues and floating rate issues were dropped from the sample. 
This produced 171 issues for 50 BRCs in 1984, 137 issues for 49 BHCs in 1985, 
160 issues for 48 BHCs in 1986, 174 issues for 43 BRCs in 1987 and 223 issues 
for 49 banks in 1988. Virtually all of t~ese bonds were issued against the BilCs 
rather than the bank. There was a fair amount of heterogeneity in terms of 
maturity, coupons and issue size. Acquisitions or name changes of banks have 
been confirmed from Moody's Bank and Finance Manual in order to maintain 
continuity in data collection. 
The risk-free rates of Treasury Securities identical in maturity to each 
debt issue were collected from Moody's Bond Record. Yields of multiple issues 
of a bank's subordinated debts are aggregated to calculate an average yield. 
Risk-premiums are calculated by simply subtracting risk-free rates of identical 
maturity from the yield measure. The risk-premium used in this study is the 
average premium of all outstanding issues for each BHC for each year. The 
on-balance and off-balance measures of risk ar.e constructed as defined earlier, 
from variables available in the FDIC Call and Income Report for the years 1984 
through 1988. The risk-premia of each BHC is matched against on-balance and 
off-balance measures of risk, and this resulted in a final sample of 32 bank and 
llHCs for each year. These risk-premia are then used as the dependent variables 
in regression analysis of on-balance and off-balance measures of bank risk. 
3.4 Analysis of Results 
Table 3 provides the coefficient estimates of a basic risk-premia model. 
Seven equations were estimated, one for each off-balance sheet group, using 
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pooled cross-section and time-series data for 32 banks and bank-holding 
companies over the years 1984-88. All off-balance sheet items have expected 
negative signs. Three of these coefficients are significant at the 1% level 
(APART, ACLC, AOBS) , tHO are significant at the 57. level (AOB, AS1{AP), and one 
is significant at the 10% level (ACOaThI). The coefficient of SLC is not 
significantly different from zero. This result is consistent Hith the results 
of Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies (1985) for Standby Letters of Credit (SLCs) but 
extends these results to other categories of OBS items. 
Variations in the risk-premia on uninsured bank debt are significantly 
correlated Hith" off-balance sheet variables, suggesting the presence of a 
llmarket discipline. II Moreover, bank liability holders viel-l OBS variables as 
risk-reducing. The pricing signal that the banking industry receives from the 
subordinated debt market appears to be at odds with the regulatory prescription 
about off-balance sheet variables. Those prescriptions require certain OBS 
items be included in the risk-based capital requirement. The risk-reducing 
potential of off-balance sheet variables indicates that bank regulators may be 
overly concerned about these banking activities and should not penalize banks 
for these OBS activities by requiring additional capital. 
The on-balance measures of risk, generally, obtain their expected signs. 
Both leverage and diversification (LEV and DrV) variables have the expected 
signs and are significant at the 57. level. The significant negative 
coefficients of OBS items along with expected signs of leverage and 
diversification (LEV and DrV) variables also suggest that risk-reducing 
diversification impacts of OilS activities dominate their risk-increasing 
impacts. The interest rate risk (AGAP) is positive and significant at the 107. 
level. The credit risk variable (ALOSS) is, however, significantly negative. 
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Here multicollinearity between credit risk and interest rate risk (1LOSS and 
AGAP) may be the cause of this perverse sign. The dividend payout ratio (POR) 
variable has an insignificant positive coefficient. The size (ASIZE) variable 
has, in general, negative coefficients and, in one case, is significant at the 
17. level. These results are consistent with studies by Pettway (1976), Pavel 
and Philis (1987) and Koppenhaver (1987). 
IV.	 The Relationship of ODS Banking Activities to Equity Risk and Systematic 
Risk of Large Dank and Dank-llolding Companies 
4.1	 Introduction 
In order to examine whether equity prices reflect OBS banking risk, both 
total risk and systematic risk have been regressed over on-balance and 
off-balance measures of risk. Total risk is proxied by standard deviation of 
equity return and systematic risk is proxied by market beta. Although the CAP~[ 
is based upon ex ante observations the suggested model uses primarily ex post 
data. The market beta is determined from past prices and, therefore, is only an 
estimate of historical beta. 
4.2	 Empirical Model 
The following two models are estimated over cross-section and time-series 
data employing a generalized least square (GLS) technique. The expected signs 
of partial derivatives appear on each independent variable: 
+ + + 
~ = f (OBS, LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR) (2) 
+ + + 
P = f (OBS, LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR) (3) 
These two models determine the relationship between the same on-balance and 
off-balance sheet variables as in risk-premia model, except that the bank's 
equity risk and systematic risk become the dependent variables. 
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Theory suggests that OBS activities provide diversification benefits to 
bank stockholders, and at the same time, increase financial risk by augmenting 
leverage. It is known that diversification potential will reduce diversifiable 
risk and leverage potential will increase financial risk of total equity risk 
respectively. "~ich effect dominates remains an empirical question. If OBS 
activities are rationalized as natural banking activity, they are not expected 
to affect non-diversifiable systematic risk as measured by beta. 
The negative sign of DIY variable indicates that diversification by bank 
loan portfolio reduces total risk. The positive sign of LEY variable indicates 
that leverage ratios of banks increase total risk. In addition, the negative 
signs of OBS variables in equation (2) imply that, after controlling for 
on-balance leverage and diversification effects, risk-reducing diversification 
effect of OBS activities dominates risk-increasing effects of OBS activities. 
4.3 Data Analysis 
Extensive data on bank off-balance sheet activities (OBS) are available 
beginning in 1984. The initial sample utilized in this study consists of the 
100 largest banks based on asset size which have continuous data over the years 
1984 through 1988. Market values of equity (EQUITY) for each bank or bank 
holding company are collected from CO~IPUSTAT yearly tapes. Daily bank stock 
returns and market returns are gathered from the CRSP and the NASDAQ daily 
tapes. Data on off-balance sheet items are taken from the FDIC Call and Income 
Reports for the lead bank of the holding company. The sample is restricted to 
those bank holding companies (BRC) whose lead bank accounts for the majority of 
consolidated holding company assets. The accounting risk variables defined ln 
the previous section (LEY, DIY, AGAP, ALOSS, POR and ASIZE) are constructed from 
data collected from the FDIC yearly tapes. Data from the FDIC tapes, the 
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COJIPUSTAT tapes, the CRSP tapes and the NASDAQ tapes are merged together, and 
this resulted in a final sample of 32 banks and bank holding companies for 1984 
through 1988. The relative size of market risk measures, accounting risk 
measures and ODS variables are shown in Table 2. 
Equity risk is proxied by the standard deviation of equity return. SIGJfAE 
is the annualized standard deviation of daily equity return. SIG~~Es are 
calculated for those bank holding companies for which 200 or more trading days 
are available on CRSP and NASDAQ tapes. It can be noted that only 63 bank 
holding companies have equity return available on CRSP tape and 82 BHCs have 
similar data available from the NASDAQ tape. 
BETAs are calculated from daily equity returns for each bank holding 
company for which 200 or more trading days are available from the CRSP and the 
NASDAQ TAPES. The standard market model is used in this study to estimate betas 
and the market index used is equally-weighted market index. Hence, these beta 
estimates are different from Scholes-Williams betas reported in the new CRSP 
tapes. Scholes and Williams (1977) calculated betas from nonsynchronous data 
using a methodology different from market model methodology. 
4.4 Analysis of Results 
Table 4 presents estimates of the explanatory variables using standard 
deviation of equity return (SIG~IAE) as the dependent variable. Off-balance 
sheet items constitute a heterogeneous collection of participations, 
commitments, and other arrangements. Therefore, it is difficult to represent 
the influence of these items in any simple way. The off-balance sheet variables 
are grouped into seven classes according to their similar characteristics. All 
off-balance sheet variables possess negative coefficients. One of these 
coefficients is significant at the 1% level (ASLC), four are significant at the 
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57. level (AOB, ACOJDI, AACLC, AOBS) and one is significant at the 1% level 
(AS'iAP). The coefficient of APART is not significantly different from zero. 
These results suggest that at least some of the off-balance sheet variables are 
risk-reducing. These results support the findings of Lynge and Lee (1987) that 
off-balance sheet items reduce total risk. 
The hypothesis that risk-reducing diversification potential of OBS items 
dominates the risk-increasing potential of OBS items can be tested by comparing 
the estimated coefficient signs of leverage and diversification (LEV and DIV) 
variables. The significant negative sign of diversification coefficient (DIV) 
indicates an inverse relationship between diversification and risk. Therefore, 
banks can achieve higher level of diversification by engaging in off-balance 
sheet activities and consequently reduce risk. The coefficients of LEV and DIV 
possess expected signs. The significant positive coefficient of leverage (LEV) 
variable indicates a direct relationship betl~een leverage employed and risk. 
Therefore, banks can increase leverage by engaging in off-balance sheet 
activities and consequently increase risk. Given that leverage and 
diversification variables are on-balance sheet measures, the significant 
negative coefficients of some off-balance sheet items, therefore, imply that 
diversification potential of ODS items dominates leverage potential after 
accounting for such effects by on-balance sheet variables, and hence result in 
an overall reduction of risk. 
The credit risk and dividend payout ratio (ALOSS and POR) variables have 
the expected positive and negative signs respectively, and are statistically 
significant. The positive coefficient of credit risk (ALOSS) variable indicates 
a direct relationship betl~een customer default-risk and overall riskiness of 
banks. The negative coefficient of dividend payout ratio (POR) variable implies 
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an lnverse relationship bet"een bank risk and dividend payout ratio. The size 
(ASIZE) variable has an unexpected positive coefficient; but here size (ASIZE) 
is also highly correlated with off-balance measures of risk, perhaps pointing 
towards a simultaneity between size and off-balance sheet items. These results 
are, however, consistent with previous studies of market-determined and 
accounting-determined measures of bank risk variables (Pettway, 1976). 
Table 5 presents estimates of explanatory variables using BETA as the 
dependent variable. The estimated coefficients of all OBS items have expected 
negative signs, and all but one are not statistically significant. These 
results suggest that most OBS activities have no effect on systematic bank r~sk. 
The results are consistent with Pettway (1976) and Lynge and Lee (1987). 
Standby Letters of Credit (ASLC) is significantly negative at the 57. level, 
implying that well-diversified investors price this banking activity as 
risk-reducing. This result validates a similar finding by Brewer, Koppenhaver 
and Wilson (1986) that equity market prices Standby Letters of Credit (ASLC) as 
risk reducing. 
The coefficients on the on-balance measures of risk have expected signs. 
Leverage (LEV) is significantly positive at the 17. level and Diversification 
(DIV) is significantly negative also at the 17. level. Credit Risk (ALOSS) is 
also significantly positive at the 17. level. Dividend payout ratio (POR) is not 
statistically significant. Although interest rate risk and size (GAP and ASIZE) 
have the wrong signs, they are not statistically significant. 
Models using the total risk (SIGMAE) as the dependent variables have higher 
average R2 compared to models using systematic risk (BETA) as the dependent 
variables (.18 versus .14). The fact that on-balance and off-balance measures 
of risk explain a larger portion of total risk than systematic risk is not 
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surprising. Total risk includes both systematic risk and specific risk. 
Certain diversifiable accounting measures of risk such as credit risk (ALOSS) 
are expected to affect mostly specific risk rather than systematic risk. 
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The primary purpose of this paper has been to examine whether "market 
discipline" exists for OBS banking risk. Default-risk premia, total equity risk 
and systematic beta risk have been regressed on various on-balance accounting 
risk variables and off-balance sheet activities. 
A pooled cross-section and time-series model, instead of simple OLS, was 
employed to perform the econometric analysis for two reasons. First, 
cross-section or time-series data alone (32 cross-sections and 5 time-periods) 
are not sufficient to extract enough degrees of freedom In regression analysis. 
Second, cross-sections and time-series relationships of OBS banking decisions 
are better captured by a pooled cross-section and time-series model. 
The major empirical findings of this study can be summarized as follows. 
First, test results support the hypothesis that risk-reducing diversification 
effects of OBS banking items dominate risk increasing effects of DBS banking 
items, thus reducing overall riskiness of banks. Second, the results also 
validate the hypothesis that OBS banking items do not affect systematic risk. 
Only Standby Letters of Credit reduce systematic risk. Third, all but one 
(APART) off-balance measures of risk in this study are risk-reducing. 
Fourth, the explanatory pOHers of the models are improved significantly 
when equity variances, instead of market betas, are used to proxy for bank risk. 
This is evidenced by significant increase in R2. Fifth, this study finds the 
presence of a "market discipline" of OBS banking activities. The market 
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participants, both stockholders and subordinated debtholders, price DBS 
activities as risk-reducing. Sixth, several on-balance measures of accounting 
risk also show statistically significant correlations with market measures of 
risk. Finally, pooled cross-section and time-series analysis of OBS banking 
risk provides better coefficient estimates (increased t-statistics) and 
increases the statistical significance of models (increased F-statistics). 
The existing policy proposal to regulate OBS banking risk by bringing them 
into a risk-based capital requirement can be analyzed in the light of empirical 
findings of this research. The results indicate that off-balance sheet 
activities, in general, reduce total risk, but do not affect systematic risk, 
implying that off-balance sheet risk is not a concern of well-diversified 
stockholders. ,nlile bank regulators are concerned with total risk and the 
probability of bank failures, the risk reducing potential of OBS activities 
indicates that additional capital requirement of DBS banking activities will 
penalize large banks. 
There is clear evidence of a "market discipline" of DBS banking risk. 
~Iarket participants price these OBS activities as risk-reducing. Therefore, 
regulatory interference in the form of additional capital requirement of OBS 
activities will create distortions in the financial intermediation market. 
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TABLE 1
 
OBS ITEMS (SCIIEDULE Re-L OFF-BALANCE SnEET VARIABLES) 
1. Securities borrowed 
2. Securities lent 
3. Commitments to purchase when issued securities 
4. Commitments to see when issued securities 
5. Notational value of interest rate swaps 
6. SLC to U.S. addresses 
7. SLC to non U.S. addresses 
8. SLC participated to others 
9. Commercial letters of credit 
10. Commitments to purchase foreign currencies 
11. Unused loan commitments 
12. Commitments to purchase futures and forward contracts 
13. Commitments to sell futures and forward contracts 
14. Obligation to purchase under option contracts 
15. Obligations to sell under optons contract 
16. Participations in acceptances conveyed to others 
17. Participations In acceptances conveyed from others 
18. Other significant commitments or contingencies 
19. Loan sold or participated to others 
The off-balance sheet variables consist of the following items:
OB = 3+6+7-8+9+10+11 
CO~ThI = 12+13+14+15+18 
PART = 8+16+17+19 
SVAP = 5 
SLC = 6+7-8 
CLC = 9 
ODS = OB + CmlM + PART + SVAP + SLC + CLC 
TABLE 2
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ACCOUNTING RISK VARIABLES,
 
OFF-BALANCE SnEET VARIABLES AND MARKET MEASURES OF RISK VARIABLESa 
Standard 
Variable SYmbol Mean Deviation 
Risk Premium RPRM .01500 .00665 
Systematic Risk BETA .85337 .40162 
Equity Risk SImlAE .01828 .01124 
Off-balance sheet groups AOB .97779 .94551 
Commitments ACmThl .16469 .24067 
Participations APART .09618 .27160 
National Value of Swaps ASVAP .32129 .52079 
Commercial Letters of Credit ACLC .01523 .01095 
Standby Letters of Credit ASLC .07394 .04687 
Total Off-Balance Items AOBS 1.58013 1.69662 
Financial Leverage LEY .94938 .01317 
Diversification Index DIY 1.74527 .67445 
Credit Risk ALOSS .01341 .00956 
Interest Rate Risk AGAP .05955 .13878 
Dividend Payout Ratio POR .50910 .74757 
Logarithm of Assets ASIZE 16.65717 .99929 
a For a sample of 32 commercial banks and bank holding companies over 
1984-1988 periods. 
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TABLE 4 
Pooled Cross-Sect'on Ind TI.e-Serl .. Results 
(Dependent Variable: SICHAE) 
[quI t 10n8 
No, Con.unt 
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(2.31)" 
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-.0015 
(-2.06) .~ 
6COHM 
--
MMr 
-
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•21 .1.98 .... 
HaTES: 1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
SICHAE Is the tnnuII hed standlrd deviation of .qulty roturns; 
AOB, ACl»lH, APART, ASlC. AClC, ASWAP tnd AOOS repreunt u ..n 
off-blhnc. shut variables; 
lEV. DIV. AGAP, AlOSS, paR Ind ASIZE repreunt flnlnclal Iever­
Ige, dIversificatIon Indu, Inlerest tile rill, credit rill, 
dividend payout Ind logarltha 0' "lfts respecll .. ly; 
Humbers In Ih. parlnthuu art t-stillstlcs; 
Slgnlflclnc. level: '. 10%; ••• 5%; •••• 1%. 
TABLE 5 
Pooled Cross-Soctlon Ind Ttllo-Slrles Results 
(Depondenl Variable: BelA) 
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